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| Title: | Strategic bidding in decentralized collaborative vehicle routing | | | Authors: | J. Los, F. Schulte, M.T.J. Spaan, R.R. Negenborn |
| | Conference: | 8th International Conference on Dynamics in Logistics (LDIC 2022) | | Address: | Bremen, Germany | | Date: | February 2022 |
| | Abstract: | Collaboration in transportation is important to reduce costs and emissions, but carriers may have incentives to bid strategically in decentralized auction systems. We investigate what the effect of the auction strategy is on the possible cheating benefits in a dynamic context, such that we can recommend a method with lower chances for carriers to cheat. We consider both a first-price auction system and a second-price auction scheme. Contrary to what was expected, a second-price auction scheme gives more room for successful strategic behaviour, while it also results in more rejected orders. A first-price auction scheme might be useful in practice if the profit shares that are allocated to the winner of an auction are selected carefully. |
| | Reference: | Strategic bidding in decentralized collaborative vehicle routing. J. Los, F. Schulte, M.T.J. Spaan, R.R. Negenborn. In Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Dynamics in Logistics (LDIC 2022), Bremen, Germany, pp. 261-274, February 2022. | | | Request: | A
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