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| Title: | Scenario-based defense mechanism against
vulnerabilities in Lagrange-based DMPC | | | Authors: | J.M. Maestre, P. Velarde, H. Ishii, R.R. Negenborn |
| | Journal: | Control Engineering Practice | | |
| | Abstract: | In this paper, we present an analysis of the vulnerability of a distributed model predictive control (DMPC) scheme in the context of cyber-security. We consider different types of the so-called insider attacks. In particular, we consider the situation where one of the local controllers sends false information to others to manipulate costs for its own advantage. Then, we propose a popular scenario-based mechanism to protect or, at least, relieve the consequences of the attack in a typical DMPC negotiation process. The theoretical and algorithmic properties of this defense mechanism are also analyzed. A real case study based on a four tank plant is provided to illustrate both the consequences of the attacks and the defense mechanisms. |
| | Reference: | Scenario-based defense mechanism against
vulnerabilities in Lagrange-based DMPC. J.M. Maestre, P. Velarde, H. Ishii, R.R. Negenborn. Control Engineering Practice, vol. 114, no. 104879, 2021. Open access. | | | Download: | Open access |
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